Proof of Evidence

Updated with more precise references, 8 October 2024

Geoffrey Woodhouse

Appeal ref: APP/L5810/W/24/3339060 and APP/L5810/W/24/3339062

Introduction

My name is Geoffrey Woodhouse.

I have a Cambridge degree in Mathematics, and an MSc and PhD in Educational Statistics. I have lived in East Sheen for 48 years and for all of that time I have been involved with education, both locally as a teacher, parent and school governor, and more widely as a lecturer in Educational Statistics at the London Institute of Education.

I have taught Mathematics in the private sector, and in a local comprehensive school and sixth-form college. My children were taught in that same local school and sixth-form college, and both went on to Cambridge. I therefore have an abiding interest in the continued success of local state-funded education.

I first became involved with this project when I read Richmond's School Place Planning Strategy of February 2018. I was shocked by its casual use of statistics, which plainly did not justify the new secondary school, and joined the Mortlake Brewery Community Group in order to write an Addendum to their submission to the council to show that Part B of the 2018 Planning Application should be rejected.

Since then, I have attended meetings of Richmond's Education and Children's Services Committee, demonstrating on each occasion that Richmond's updated forecasts were invalid, that there was no need for a new secondary school and that it would harm local schools, which needed to expand in order to make their newly installed sixth forms viable, and that is my purpose now.

Executive Summary

1. My evidence considers the extent of the need for the six-form entry secondary school, with sixth form, proposed in Appeal B. It will show that, despite the requirement within the site allocation, there is no demonstrable need for such a school to be provided on the appeal site at the present time or in the short, medium or long term.
2. To make this point, I shall be considering 4 sets of predictions produced by Richmond, in 2015, 2017, 2019 and 2023. My evidence will show that each set of predictions produced forecasts that were clearly unrealistic at the time, and the first three, up to 2019, have proved to have been significantly overstated.
3. On each occasion, there was an important decision to be made and outcome to be achieved:
   - in 2015, to persuade Richmond's Cabinet to agree to change the planning requirement on the Stag Brewery site
   - in 2017, to persuade DfE that there was a pressing need for a new secondary school in the rest of Richmond
   - in 2019, to secure at the Richmond Planning Meeting of January 2020 approval of Planning Application B, to build the secondary school
   - in 2023, to secure the same outcome at the Richmond Meeting of July 2023

   All of these aims were achieved, but I shall show that in no case were the forecasts presented justified.
4. I shall show that Richmond, that is, Achieving for Children or AfC, which is the body that is charged with producing these statistics, has a poor record of accuracy, and that the most recent set of statistics is as flawed as the three previous ones. In particular:
   a. In the 10 years which have passed since the 2015 decision, the capacity issues forecast by AfC have not materialised.
   b. AfC have historically failed, and continue to fail, to take into account falling primary school numbers which flow through into the need for secondary school places.
   c. The shortfall figure for secondary school places is based on inflated estimates of Year 7 pupil numbers
   d. AfC's figures are based on unquantified claims of "substantial" future secondary-age yield generated by four future housing developments in the area
5. The School Place Planning Strategy (SPPS) for 2023, the latest evidence of school place needs, is flawed for these same reasons. Additionally, it makes statements about future birth rates that are at variance with ONS data. I will address each of these flaws in AfC's data in turn in my Proof.
6. As a result of these flawed data, it is believed by nearly all councillors that without the proposed school Richmond will be unable to meet its statutory duty to provide adequate secondary places for its residents. On the contrary, forecasts of these yields reasonably made using recognised sources of information show that there will be no need for a new secondary school in the Mortlake area for at least the next 20 years, and probably more.
7. The remainder of this Proof of Evidence is structured under the following headings:
   a. The falling birth rate in Richmond
   b. School capacity shortfalls historically forecast by AfC have not materialised
   c. SPPS 2023 – Year 7 take-up without housing allowance
   d. SPPS 2023 – Year 7 take-up with housing allowance
   e. SPPS 2023 and SCAP 2023 – forecasting of Year 7
   f. Adjustment for housing yield
   g. Rational predictions of pupil need

1. The falling birth rate in Richmond

1. Richmond's birth rate is falling. See the chart below:



2. This chart shows the decline in Richmond's birth rate: actual from 2008 to 2022 [1], and as forecast by NOMIS from 2018 to 2043 [2]. NOMIS is an arm of the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
3. The actual decline from 2010 to 2022 is from 2992 to1827, or 39%.
4. The NOMIS forecast decline shows a further drop of 81 between 2022 and 2030 relative to the forecast value of 2176 in 2022, a further decline of 4%.
5. This would lead to an overall decline of 41% over the 20 years from 2010 to 2030.
6. These are significant declines, and should be kept in mind when considering my evidence.

2. Capacity shortfalls historically forecast by AfC have not materialised

1. As evidence of need for school places, Richmond uses the School Place Planning Strategy (SPPS), which has been updated in 2015 [3, 8], 2018 [4], 2019 [5] and 2023 (CDE.30).

2. The DfE uses the annual School Capacity Survey (SCAP) [7]

3. A report [3] was presented to Richmond's Cabinet on 15 October 2015, seeking approval to update the existing *School Place Planning Strategy 2015-2024* to SPPS 2015 [8].

4. This approval was granted, with the result that the then adopted Planning Brief (CDE.02) and associated Site Allocations also were changed to specify a secondary school on the Stag Brewery site. It became Richmond policy.

5. But the forecasts submitted in support of the new SPPS 2015 were flawed. They assumed contributory primary schools would be completely full in Year 6 [11].

6. These obviously invalid forecasts exceeded the eventual outcomes as in the following table[1]:

Table 6.1 Forecast and actual Year 7 shortfalls

Academic year	Forecast shortfall	Actual shortfall
2019/20	up to c.150	24
2022/23	up to c.250+	50

7. Year 7 shortfalls were predicted in SCAP17 to accelerate towards 300 from 2021 onwards [14[2]]. This was the justification the DfE used to move Livingstone Academy [15]. But that 300 shortfall was completely accounted for by (a) undeclared capacity of 200 per year [16], exaggerating the size of the shortfall, and (b) the change in forecasting method, causing the apparent acceleration [17].

8. The argument for the new secondary school has continued to be supported by inflated estimates of Year 7, although the capacity numbers (which were inaccurate chiefly in the West) have been corrected.

9. The single secondary planning area (the whole borough), used up to 2017 [18, 19], was split into two ('West' and 'East') from 2018 [20] onwards. The SCAP forecast methodology document was updated to reflect this, but not updated to reflect the change in forecasting method that had already taken place in SCAP17.

10. The evidence for this change in forecasting method is provided by (a) the forecasts themselves, which cannot be made to fit the stated methodology and (b) SPPS 2018 [4, 25].

11. This change in forecasting method, to which DfE were not alerted, meant that, instead of using their own forecasts of Year 6 to forecast Year 7, Richmond used a fixed census of younger year groups.

12. SPPS 2018 shows [25] that the forecast Year 7 cohorts and consequent shortfalls in school places were obtained by applying a fixed multiplier to cohort sizes in the October 2016 census of

    12.1. Year 6 for entry to Year 7 in 2017

    12.2. Year 5 for entry to Year 7 in 2018

    12.3. Year 4 for entry in 2019, and so on down to

    12.4. Reception for entry to Year 7 in 2023

13. Richmond Primary schools experience considerable outward migration as cohorts progress from Reception to Year 6. [14c]

[1] October Census are available through FoI only.

[2] A technical report, which I wrote in 2020, on anomalies in Richmond's reporting of forecasting statistics.

14. Thus, the Reception Year group cohort in the East of Richmond[3] in 2014 shrank from 941 to 821 pupils by the time it reached Year 6 in 2020.

15. It is simply untrue to say, as the note [25] to the table on p16 of SPPS 2018 states, that

    15.1. *Conversion rates from Reception to Year 6 average at 100%*

16. This has never been the case.

17. The continued failure of Richmond to take account of this net outward migration, which I have termed 'primary cohort shrinkage', is responsible for repeated overestimation by Richmond of Year 7 cohorts.

18. The reason it is clear that in SCAP 2017 Richmond did not follow its stated Forecasting Methodology [19, 14b], is that the forecasts of Year 7 need in SCAP 2017 are exactly the same as in SPPS 2018[4].

19. Because of this change of its actual forecasting method between SCAPs 2016 and 2017, DfE believed that need for secondary places (Year 7 in particular, but also Years 8 to 11) was accelerating.

20. This acceleration of forecast Year 7 shortfall has been an abiding feature of all tables of secondary prediction in SPPS and in SCAP.

21. It enabled Richmond to succeed in its aim of persuading DfE that there was a pressing need for a new secondary school in Richmond.[27]

22. It continues to satisfy DfE that that need persists.

23. It has also persuaded planners, both in Richmond and in GLA, that the school proposed for Stag Brewery is justified.

24. For example, in SPPS 2019 and SCAP 2019,

    24.1. shrinkage in primary cohorts continued to be ignored

    24.2. further distortion was introduced by using the October 2017 census instead of the October 2018 census, which was available

    24.3. a Year 6 figure of 927 (952 in SCAP) was used to forecast Year 7 in 2025, when Reception in October 2018 was known to be 816.

    Relying on SPPS 2019, the Officers' Report to Planning in January 2020 claimed that Year 7 shortfall in the East would rise to 5 forms by 2021 and more than 5 forms by 2025. If based on Year 6 forecasts, the forecast shortfall in Year 7 for 2021 would have been 3 forms in 2021 and less than 1 form in 2025.

    It was important for the Council to make these forecasts, because they appeared to be *prima facie* evidence of the need for a new 6FE school, but the data manipulation is blatant, as shown in [28].

25. The forecasts of SPPS 2019 proved to be significantly overstated.

26. These forecasts persuaded Richmond to approve Application B of the Planning Application heard on 19 January 2020.

27. They also persuaded GLA in its call-in review of the whole application that evidence of need for the school had been provided. Thus, the third of the four aims listed at point 3 in the Executive Summary was achieved. But the forecasts were absurdly high.

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[3] Since 2018, Richmond has been split into two parts for secondary planning purposes: the West (Planning Area 1), which is the Middlesex side of the Thames and the East (PA 2), on the Surrey side. There are 10 Planning Areas for primary, 1 to 5 in West and 6 to 10 in the East. The cohort of 941 Reception pupils consists of all pupils in Reception classes in primary planning areas 6 to 10.

[4] SCAP 2017 was forecasting for the same set of years as SPPS 2018 (published late, in February of that year).

28. The forecasts of SCAPs also have continued to be exaggerated, because in SCAP also Richmond consistently fails to account in its forecasts for outward migration from primary cohorts.
29. Thus, Richmond has persuaded DfE that need for this new school in the East of Richmond persists.

3. SPPS 2023: Year 7 take-up without housing yield

1. SPPS 2023 (CDE.30) is the evidential base for part B (the school) of the Planning Application heard in Richmond on 19 July 2023. The school continues to be proposed in Appeal B.
2. SPPS 2023
   2.1. continues to ignore primary cohort shrinkage in its short-term forecasts
   2.2. makes unquantified claims of 'substantial' future secondary-age yield generated by the four future local housing developments
   2.3. makes unrealistic assumptions about pupil yields, where these are quantified.
3. SPPS 2023 makes assumptions about future birth rate that are at variance with ONS NOMIS predictions.
4. These failings have the predictable effect of ensuring that, once again, a steep rise in secondary need is forecast for the final two years of the forecast period in SPPS 2023 and the final four years of the forecast period in SCAP 2023.
5. Given the poor record of this method of forecasting – which is still not admitted to in Richmond's SCAP returns – it should not come as a surprise if the forecasts, particularly for the final years of each set, turn out to be greatly overstated when we reach those years and see the outcomes.
6. SPPS 2023 continues to overstate the short-term forecasts of Year 7 – which I will call the forecasts up to Year 7 entry in 2029.
7. It does this mainly by ignoring primary shrinkage as before.
8. But now the situation with falling rolls is such that even relying on the latest usable census to continue forward unchanged year on year into the future as cohorts progress is not enough to produce the steep rise towards 2027 that is needed in order to convince both the council and, through SCAP, the DfE. I will deconstruct the table on p59 Section 5.97 of the SPPS in a moment but, even before I do, it is clear that the take-up rate, so called, used to convert the Eastern half Year 6 cohort, so called, is increasing massively through the forecast years.
9. Yearly increases through 80%, 81%, 85% and 87% have been needed in order to produce the steep rise in Year 7 requirement to 702 – a shortfall of 132, or more than 4 forms – that will appear to make a new school necessary.
10. Such rises are unheard of. Why should they now occur?

4. SPPS 2023: Year 7 take-up with housing allowance

1. On p50 of SPPS 2023, Section 5.52 explains:
2. *As there is an upward trend in the numbers of places required in Year 7 in the east of the borough, the 2024–2026 forecasts assume a 1% increase each year in the take-up rate.*
3. This 1% increase is not visible in the table of Section 5.53.
4. The relevant part of this Table is the lower third, below the lower of the two solid black bars. This part of the table is reproduced in Section 5.97 on p59.
5. The actual take-up rates applied are as I described in Section 3 para 9. It is necessary to deconstruct the table to see what is going on.

Table 5.1 Forecasts of Year 7

Academic year of Year 7	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28
'Year 6 cohort' = unchanged Oct 22 census	**821**	**813**	**772**	766	717	804	804
Take-up rate from Year 6 (para 5.52)	71.9%	76.3%	80.3%	81.3%	82.3%	83.3%	83.3%
Year 7 forecast without Homebase	**590**	**620**	620	623	590	670	670
'Adjusted' take-up rate to include Homebase	71.9%	76.3%	80.3%	81.3%	84.5%	87.3%	87.3%
Final Year 7 forecast	**590**	**620**	620	623	606	702	702
Actual addition for Homebase					16	32	32

6. The 1% increases in 2024, 2025 and 2026 can now be seen, highlighted in green. But the 80.3% take-up in 2023 is not indicative of a trend. It is an assumption. I return to this later.
7. The unheard-of take-up rates of 83.3% are still not enough. A Year 7 forecast of 670 is a shortfall of 100 places – only 100 places, just over 3 forms. The forecast shortfall in 2025/26 is less than a form.
8. The additions to bring the final shortfalls to over 4 forms are due to allowances for Homebase yield shown in blue.
9. These attempt to carry out the adjustment described just after the statement quoted at 2 above:
   9.1. *For 2025 and 2026, the take-up number is augmented by the likely initial pupil yield from the Homebase development of 16 and 15 children respectively.* (CDE.30, p50, section 52)
10. It would have been better to show these explicitly.
11. They are based on the following assumption, taken from SPPS p15 Section 3.22:
    11.1. *It will also be assumed that of the 39 11–16 year-olds, most of them – assumed at 80%, i.e. 31 – are likely to be of Year 7 age, as parents/carers are more likely to move just before or when their child starts secondary school than a year or two later. It will also be assumed that half these pupil yields will be factored into the forecasts for 2025 entry and half for 2026, due to the phasing of the construction.*
    11.2. This in turn follows from the estimate, 39, of the total secondary yield of the Homebase development. See SPPS 2023 p13 Section 3.13.
12. There are two problems
    12.1. Although the estimate of total yield is reasonable at 39, it is not reasonable to assume that 80% of them would be likely to be of Year 7 age. It is not the case that in-year admissions, tabulated for the whole borough (why not separately for East and West?) as part of SPPS 2023 Section 5.22, are skewed towards Year 7
    12.2. The second problem seems to be conceptual. It appears to be the forecasters' belief that the estimated total yield is a yearly addition to the requirement for places in Year 7. The addition

made for 2026/27 should have been 15 (or 16), not 32. And there should be no addition for 2027/28. By that time, according to the assumptions, 80% of the *total yield* has been admitted.

13. The second problem above might have been picked up by an alert councillor, had these numbers been made explicit. But in any case a more reasonable assumption would be that 1/10 of the total yield, or 4 students, might have been admitted to Year 7 in each year from 2025/26 to 2027/28, yielding forecast shortfalls for the final 3 years of 24, 104 and 104 respectively.

14. But this, too, would be a serious overstatement, in view of

    a) the continuing failure to allow for shrinkage of primary cohorts

    b) the unjustified raising of the take-up rate.

15. I now complete the analysis of the forecasting in SPPS 2023.

5. SPPS 2023 and SCAP 2023: forecasting of Year 6

Tables referred to in this Section are in Appendix 1. Data in bold in these tables are known.

1. Forecasting of Year 7 in the East of Richmond, and consequently of secondary need as a whole, has been dominated since 2015 by the necessity to demonstrate the need for a new secondary school rather than to achieve accuracy. SPPS 2023 is no exception.
2. In this Section I consider
    2.1. over-forecasting of Year 6
    2.2. the hiatus between the forecasts of Year 6 and Year 7
    2.3. arbitrary choices of take-up rate
    2.4. incorrect understanding and application of housing yields
    2.5. consequent reliance on unverified and unquantified description of future yield of housing developments
3. With previous editions of the SPPS, I have relied on the parallel SCAP data to estimate by how much the SPPS forecasts have been overstated.
4. I have felt that the needs of primary phase places have been forecast reasonably well in SCAP.
5. However, the forecasts of primary place needs in SCAP 2023 (CDE.30) do not seem reasonable.
6. In particular, the estimates of Reception cohorts, stated in the Forecast Methodology (CDE.34) to be based upon births 4 years previously, do not seem to follow the known trend in birth rate.
7. I used NOMIS birth data at local authority level to calculate what historical percentage of the births in Richmond translated to Reception cohorts in the East, shown in Appendix 1 Table 1.
8. Since 2016 that percentage has risen slightly, and I used the highest of these known percentages to predict Reception cohort sizes in the East up to 2026 from the known birth data up to 2022.
9. I predicted Reception in the East from 2027 to 2029 from predicted birth data for years 2023 to 2025.
10. These and the known primary cohort numbers from the October 2023 Census I then used, by applying 9-year average Year to Year survival rates, to form the forecasts of primary cohorts in Appendix 1 Table 2.
11. These differ markedly from the SCAP 2023 forecasts of primary cohorts in Appendix 1 Table 3.
12. I applied a take-up rate of 78% to the resulting Year 6 (leaver) cohorts to forecast Year 7 cohorts.
13. The proposed increases in this take-up rate in SPSS 2023 appear to be unjustified.
14. The 'upward trend', claimed to have been established by the recovery in 2022 from the low take-up rate in 2021, was confirmed in 2023 to have been merely a recovery, not the start of the unprecedented year-on-year rise assumed in the table on p59 of CDE.30.
15. As I was using forecasts of Year 6 and not Year 5, 4, 3, 2,1 and Reception census data from October 2022 census, the derived forecasts of Year 7, without addition for Homebase yield, are lower than the corresponding forecasts in Table 5.1, Section 4, as shown in Appendix 1 Table 4.
16. The adjustments for housing yield are considered in Section 6.

6. Adjustment for housing yield

Councillor Crookdake has done valuable work obtaining estimates of housing yields for

- Homebase
- Stag Brewery
- Barnes Hospital
- Kew Retail Park
- Other SAs to be approved

I will not duplicate this work. I have chosen the DfE Dashboard calculations for Richmond, as they claim to predict the yield of state school pupils.

1. The Dashboard produces slightly higher estimates for some age yields than the GLA calculator.
2. My aim is to show that the phased yields of the units in these developments will never outstrip the fall in the rest of the population of Richmond predicted by NOMIS. Recall the chart in Section 1 para 1.
3. I shall describe the model to predict the total Year 7 need generated by the new arrivals into these developments and the timing of their arrival, using STAG as an example.
4. It was necessary to establish the phasing of the development: I received valuable help from Mr Peter Eaton, who used the phasing information in the planning application to sequence the building of the blocks; determine for me the bedroom/ tenure mix of the units in each; and give an estimate of when each block would be completed ready for occupation.
5. It was assumed that building of Phase 1 East and West could begin, if consented, towards the end of 2025.
6. It was assumed that most blocks would take 2 to 3 years to build, and that 25% of each phase, except phase 4, would be completed and released for occupation half a year earlier than the rest.
7. It was also assumed that new occupants would arrive instantaneously, and that all blocks would be fully occupied. Both are generous assumptions.
8. The DfE calculator combined with the timings for completion of each block enabled me to produce a schedule showing the additional primary and secondary yields arriving in each year of building.
9. Once arrived, the effect of each student continues. A year 3 student arriving in 2028 will be a year 4 student still living in STAG in 2029, to join all the new year 4 students who arrive in 2029.
10. There will be some movers out, but it is assumed they will be replaced by incomers, on average in a balanced way across the year groups.
11. The final table is shown overleaf.

Table 11.1

	1yr back							
Year of Y7 entry	Y6 with no Housing	Cu Y6 from Housing	Total Y6 leavers	% Take-up	Y7 with no Housing	Cu Y7 from Housing	Total Y7	Spare with PAN 600
2023	**772**		**772**	**77.5%**	**598**		**598**	**2**
2024	764		764	78.0%	596		596	4
2025	697		697	78.0%	544		544	56
2026	775		775	78.0%	605		605	-5
2027	731	2	733	78.0%	570	5	575	25
2028	694	5	700	78.0%	542	14	556	44
2029	680	18	699	78.0%	531	21	551	49
2030	663	23	686	78.0%	517	25	542	58
2031	657	30	687	78.0%	513	36	549	51
2032	648	42	691	78.0%	506	43	549	51
2033	640	46	686	78.0%	499	49	548	52
2034	634	49	683	78.0%	494	51	545	55
2035	630	52	682	78.0%	491	54	546	54
2036	626	45	671	78.0%	489	46	534	66
2037	624	44	668	78.0%	487	47	533	67
2038	622	42	664	78.0%	485	42	528	72
2039	620	29	650	78.0%	484	29	513	87
2040	619	25	644	78.0%	483	25	508	92
2041	619	19	639	78.0%	483	19	502	98
2042	620	13	633	78.0%	483	13	496	104
2043	620	9	629	78.0%	484	9	493	107

12. As a result of moving through the years, it is assumed that each primary age child who arrives will eventually join Year 6, but in a phased way.

13. Table 11.1 shows the combined effect of these combinations through all Year groups, as far as Year 7.

14. Even with all the generous assumptions, a 1FE expansion of a local school or schools will always show a surplus of places, as the final column shows.

7. Rational predictions of future need

1. Forecasting of future secondary need in Richmond is riddled with anomalies. See [14], which describes the anomalies attending the forecasts made in SPPS 2018 and 2019 and SCAP 2017 and 2019.
2. Since 2015, the School Place Planning Strategies have been dominated by more and more extended arguments in favour of the new school, rather than by seeking an accurate prediction of need.
3. It is the responsibility of AfC to produce rational forecasts of future school place need.
4. This is, of course, not a straightforward job, but those responsible seem keen to lower expectations.
5. An early example appears at para1.8, on p5 of SPPS 2023:
    5.1. *Admissions patterns and other circumstances can occur contrary to expectations, and, as a result, school place planning is not, and never will be, an exact science*
6. On p63, this paragraph (5.110) appears:
    6.1. *Livingstone Academy would be a school for many generations to come, so disputes as to the extent of forecast short- to medium-term demand for it are academic; the balance of probability overwhelmingly suggests that – in addition to the already much-increased high demand for places – housing development, demographic change and the economy will require a fourth state-funded secondary school in the eastern half of the borough at some point, and most likely sooner rather than later, given that the places could, as noted at paragraph 5.80, have already have been filled on National Offer Day 2022.*
7. I have shown that this is not the case.
8. Understandably councillors are weary. This argument has been going on for nearly 10 years. But it still remains possible, with effort, to chart a way through the difficulties that always attend a forecasting exercise. Paragraph 5.110 encourages loose thinking.
9. Weary councillors often resort to the 'just in case' argument. But they haven't considered the implications of the chart at the start of this report.
10. Richmond is passing through a peak of demand generated by the large Reception cohorts around 2014.
11. The Reception cohort of 2023 is the smallest since that of 2009.
12. The chart on p3 in section 1 of this Proof shows that this trend is set go continue for a long time.
13. The NOMIS projections already *overestimate* the population.
14. My table 11.1 on p12 suggests that the most difficult future year for placing Year 7 pupils will be 2026 – before *any* of these housing units will be occupied.
15. But the demand, according to my calculations, will be about 605 – a shortfall of 35.
16. We have already handled worse, in 2022.
17. 2022 was always predicted to be a peak year, and so it has proved.
18. My model allows some of the parameters, for example, of course, the year 6 to 7 take-up rate, to be varied.
19. I would welcome the opportunity to demonstrate the effects.
20. Naturally, there is some uncertainty in any prediction exercise, but the danger is clearly one of over-provision
21. It would be foolish and damaging to our existing schools to increase that over-provision by a whole new school.

Appendix 1

Table 1													
Estimates of Reception cohort size in the East of Richmond					**Data in bold are known**								
Live births in England and Wales down to local authority local area													
ONS Crown Copyright Reserved [from Nomis on 21 April 2024]													
Richmond data											Forecasts		
Birth date	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*
Births	**2,805**	**2,589**	**2,609**	**2,544**	**2,441**	**2,310**	**2,181**	**2,021**	**2,120**	**1,827**	*1809*	*1798*	*1786*
Rec 4 years later	**2457**	**2330**	**2414**	**2359**	**2225**	**2173**	**2106**	**1952**	**2047**	**1764**			
Reception date	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	*2027*	*2028*	*2029*
Reception % of births	88%	90%	93%	93%	91%	94%	97%	97%	97%	97%			
Rec 4 years later in East	**879**	**816**	**845**	**800**	**771**	**769**	**737**	*683*	*716*	*617*	*611*	*607*	*603*
Rec E % of births	31%	32%	32%	31%	32%	33%	34%	34%	34%	34%	*34%*	*34%*	*34%*

Table 2

Forecasts of primary cohorts based on birth rate and historical cohort shrinkage unadjusted for housing yields

	Recep	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6
2023/24	737	762	762	779	800	708	764
2024/25	683	743	747	740	755	787	697
2025/26	716	688	728	725	717	742	775
2026/27	617	722	674	707	702	705	731
2027/28	*611*	622	708	655	685	691	694
2028/29	*607*	*616*	610	687	634	673	680
2029/30	*603*	*612*	*604*	592	665	624	663
	Based on predicted births						
Survival rates		R to Y1	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 5	5 to 6
		1.0078	0.9800	0.9708	0.9687	0.9839	0.9847

Table 3

SCAP 2023 forecasts of primary cohorts

	Recep	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6
2023/24	754	784	775	800	786	715	775
2024/25	724	758	777	776	778	777	721
2025/26	731	726	751	778	754	769	784
2026/27	824	732	719	752	756	745	776
2027/28	846	827	724	719	729	748	752

Table 4

Forecasts of Year 7 compared

AY	SPPS with no housing	78% of shrunk Y6[1] no housing	SPPS WITH housing	SCAP	Y6[1] & Y7 WITH housing
2023/24	620	**598**	620	620	**598**
2024/25	623	596	623	623	596
2025/26	590	544	606	606	544
2026/27	670	605	702	702	605
2027/28	670	570	702	702	575
2028/29	[1] as in Table 2			702	556
2029/30				702	551

References

[1] 1 ONS Birth Summary Data

[2] 2 NOMIS population projections for Richmond

[3] 4 Public reports pack 15102015 1900 Cabinet, pp5-10

[4] 5 School Place Planning Strategy (SPPS) 2018

[5] 6 School Place Planning Strategy (SPPS) 2019

[6] Not in use

[7] Only SCAP 2023 is readily available, in **CDE.31** Richmond School Capacity Forecasts 2023

SCAP background data can be accessed through
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-school-capacity

3 Full Technical Report on the School v5.7 REFERENCE
provides details for SCAPs 2016-2019

[8] 4 Public reports pack 15102015 1900 Cabinet, pp11-53

[9], [10] Not in use

[11] 4 Public reports pack 15102015 1900 Cabinet, p6 Sections 3.6-3.14, in particular, Section 3.14

[12], [13] Not in use

[14] 3 Full Technical Report on the School v5.7 REFERENCE
Executive summary.

[14a] Executive Summary Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, showing undeclared capacity and overstated need.

[14b] Executive Summary Tables 1, 2, 3

[14c] Executive Summary Table 1

[15] 13 FoI on Basic Need information, p9, point 6
also available online at:

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/basic_need_information_relating#incoming-1372406
(response 19 December 2018)

[16] 3 Full Technical Report on the School v5.7 REFERENCE,
Executive summary Table 4 and Part 1.2 (pp 26-35), supported by:

Supplemental Funding agreements and correspondence:

14 St Richard Reynolds Funding correspondence	
15 Grey Court School Funding Agreement	p8, Clause 17
16 Orleans Park School Funding Agreement	p9, Clause 17
17 Teddington School Funding Agreement	p8, Clause 17
18 Waldegrave School Funding Agreement	p10, Clause 17
19 Christs School Funding correspondence	
20 Hampton High Funding Agreement	p11, Summary
21 Twickenham School Funding Agreement	p11, Summary

22 Richmond Park Academy Funding Agreement p2, paragraph 2.5

[17] 3 Full Technical Report on the School v5.7 REFERENCE,
Part 1.1 (pp 15-25)

[18] 7 SCAP 2016 Forecast Methodology

[19] 8 SCAP 2017 Forecast Methodology

[20] 9 SCAP 2018 Forecast Methodology

[21] 10 SCAP 2019 Forecast Methodology

[22] 11 SCAP 2021 Forecast Methodology

[23] 12 SCAP 2022 Forecast Methodology

[24] Not in use

[25] see 5 School Place Planning Strategy (SPPS) 2018, p16, Table of predictions
see also [14b]

[27] 3 Full Technical Report on the School v5.7 REFERENCE, p143, Appendix E1

[28] 3 Full Technical Report on the School v5.7 REFERENCE,
Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 (pp 40-46), in particular, Table 31